Mozambique"s transition from war to peace : USAID"s lessons learned

USAID was active in the transition, supporting the peace and working with other donors to make sure that the process stayed on track. This paper documents the lessons learned in the transition. USAID"s transition program encompassed three strategic objectives: avoid war- and drought-related famine and death, contribute to implementation of the peace accord, and help to reintegrate populations into stable and productive social and economic activities. The Mission modified existing projects and developed new ones to meet changing needs, relying on task forces to design, implement, and monitor aspects of the program. It also developed an innovative approach to monitoring people-level impacts, relying on a combination of statistical data from secondary sources and information from site visits and other reports. Four projects formed the core of the transition strategy. The PVO Support Project, operational since 1990, used PVOs to help reintegrate rural populations. The Democratic Initiatives Project, initiated in 1991, provided funds to the United Nations for election logistics, training, and civic education materials, and grants to U.S. organizations for civic education and poll monitor training. The Demobilization/Reintegration Support Project helped to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants and funded mine clearance activities. The Rural Access Activity rehabilitated roads and bridges to facilitate repatriation, reintegration, and economic rejuvenation. In addition, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance continued to provide emergency food and non-food distribution to mitigate the lingering effects of the 1991-92 drought and to help rural populations get through to the first post-war harvest. The challenges in the transition were enormous. The Mission was understaffed, depended heavily on regional contract support, and was able to draw on limited technical support in the Regional Economic Development Support Office. Preparing for elections in a country with very low literacy levels, minimal government capacity, and almost non-existent infrastructure meant that everything was being done for the first time. Collaborating with the United Nations involved several layers of authority, since new units were established to address specific aspects of the peace accord. Nonetheless, USAID"s successes were tremendous. The Agency was able to undertake activities that no other donor could. USAID learned several lessons for its own transition program, and others that pertain to the international community. (1) USAID"s presence in Mozambique before the signing of the peace accord facilitated the transition program because the Mission already had operational projects, though limited, and staff on the ground who were familiar with the country. (2) The onset of peace, however, meant that staff levels were suddenly inadequate -- a situation that USAID is likely to face in other war-torn countries. To compensate, USAID used creative solutions, establishing task forces, relying on personal service contractors and foreign service nationals, and adapting the Mission"s organizational structure to new needs. (3) Interagency task forces greatly facilitated cooperation and communication among USAID, the Embassy, and the U.S. Information Service, yielding tangible results in each entity"s activities. Top leadership encouraged staff to work together and emphasized information-sharing. (4) Having a range of flexible funding sources to draw on is necessary; if one funding source cannot be used for this or that purpose, others can fill critical gaps. (5) War-to-peace transitions require risk taking. Donors may find it necessary to proceed with an activity before having complete confidence in its technical feasibility, a situation which would be unlikely in a more traditional development program. (6) Transitions take time, despite pressures to move as quickly as possible from signing a peace agreement to holding elections. A more realistic timetable in Mozambique would have allowed better planning, and consequently enhanced the use of human and financial resources. (7) Given the fast pace nature of transitions and the need to implement activities quickly, the Missions"s limited capacity for executing grants and contracts slowed program implementation despite the good cooperation the Mission received from the Regional Contracts Office in Swaziland. (8) With respect to elections, USAID encountered difficulties in depending on unsolicited proposals. Greater reliance on competitive bidding procedures would have saved time and reduced tangled negotiations. (9) Relations between institutions can be highly complicated. Roles and relationships need to be clearly articulated and understood between organizations working in the same programs or areas. (10) Evenhanded treatment of opposing parties is essential. One implication is that implementation of many activities will need to be through both nongovernmental and host government institutions. (11) The UN bureaucracy is not well-suited to fast-paced transition programs. UN involvement should be therefore based on an unambiguous command structure and tailored to the situation on the ground, and make maximum use of agencies and organizations already active in the country. Includes bibliography. (Author abstract, modified)