Payment and Predation: The Politics of Wages and Violence in the Congolese Army

This requires that leaders distinguish the loyal from the untrustworthy, a particularly challenging exercise in post-conflict settings with weak institutions. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the largest operational theater in North Kivu is the epicenter of one of the most violent conflicts in Africa. Congolese soldiers operating in North Kivu face a fundamental problem of discrimination. Leaders must distinguish those who are loyal from those who are untrustworthy in order to selectively empower the former and reduce the threat of the latter. Without the technology to distinguish between soldier type, leaders can either weaken all soldiers and open themselves to greater external threat, or strengthen all soldiers, which opens them up to threat from within. This dilemma is particularly important in post-conflict armies comprised of previously warring parties that are often the product of negotiated settlements used to end violence. Research conducted with members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) between 2014 and 2015 reveals that leaders use non-payment as a screening strategy to distinguish the loyal from the untrustworthy. Non-payment causes unpaid soldiers to engage in extortion and violence against civilians, which is managed by commanding officers and used to cultivate internal cohesion. This process helps the regime overcome the guardianship dilemma and generates the very loyalty that leaders seek to identify. The use of non-payment as a screening strategy is a novel explanation for how leaders use financial constraints to overcome classic organizational dilemmas in ways that ultimately cause violence against civilians. This approach is particularly relevant in post-conflict settings where institutions are weak and the risk of coup-risk, violent conflict, and civilian abuse is high. The research highlights the importance of understanding the inner-workings of hard-to-access and understudied institutions, including militaries, in order to develop effective strategies for building effective armies and reducing the risk of violence. The study draws on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, including 100 open-ended qualitative interviews and a fine-grained quantitative analysis of 350 members of the military. The research provides a detailed anatomy of payments, violence, and loyalty, and sheds light on the complex relationships between leaders, soldiers, and civilians in post-conflict settings. The findings have important implications for policymakers and practitioners seeking to build effective armies and reduce the risk of violence in fragile states.