Project assistance completion report : agrarian reform support program (ARSP) [AID project # 492-0431]

A 12/91 assessment found that the program apparently exceeded targets for three of five program performance indicators, achieving 187% of target in land area surveyed (342,332 ha vs. 182,695 ha); 102% of target in emancipation patents distributed (by ha) (134,081 vs. 131,223); and 120% of target in emancipation patents generated (by number of patents) (166,912 vs. 138,130). The other two indicators, emancipation patents generated (by ha) and emancipation patents generated (by number of patents), achieved only 68% (121,681 vs. 176,987) and 80% (154,271 vs. 190,633) of target, respectively. Despite this apparent success, analysis of the above data yields several less sanguine observations. (1) Performance in distributing emancipation patents was significantly enhanced by a backlog of patents generated before the program. (2) The average patent generated and distributed was less than one ha -- considerably smaller than the typical small rice/corn farms already in existence. However, farmers may receive more than one patent, indicating that the number of agrarian reform beneficiaries may be overstated by as much as a factor of four. (3) Generation of emancipation patents (running at 37% of land surveyed) is a major bottleneck. Unless this problem is given greater attention, the overall system will soon run down. The CARP/OLT performance indicators give equal weight to intermediate items (survey and generation) and final output (distribution) indicators, reflecting internal distortions. CARP's program of agrarian reform appears to be more redistributive (i.e., for beneficiaries' sake) than productive (i.e., for the country's economic benefit). Indeed, far from solving the problem of rural poverty, OLT may be exacerbating it. Small farms are generally not viable entities. Most are operating below the per capita poverty level and off-farm employment is necessary to sustain the family, while many landless workers are no longer employed by the newly fragmented small farm families. Furthermore, CARP's objectives are hampered by weaknesses in farmer support services as well. This analysis raises warning signals about the need to: (1) review the viability of the overall land redistribution policy; (2) provide support services in order to attain and maintain individual small farm viability; and (3) improve program planning to develop and maintain a sustainable thrust in CARP implementation. Lessons learned include the following. (1) Precise definitions of performance indicators should be verified and/or field tested with line operating personnel before being established. In this program, the terms established as performance indicators, although seemingly precise at the outset, were not the same as terms used operationally in existing government reports. Furthermore, methods, interpretations, and sources of data collection frequently differed among the implementing agencies and their field offices. (2) Reporting requirements should be verified and/or field tested with line operating personnel as well. (3) For maximum effectiveness and field cooperation, program monitoring should be concurrent with program operations.