Zambia democratic governance project : final evaluation

The project succeeded in some of its endeavors, but not all. The political context in which it was implemented deteriorated as the government's relations with opposition parties and advocacy groups became increasingly polarized, and the intensity of the conflict has made implementation of some project components difficult if not impossible. Project support for liberalizing the constitution was frustrated because the government insisted on focusing the constitutional revision process on its own political objectives, specifically on limiting the effectiveness of the opposition and preventing former President Kenneth Kaunda from running in the 1996 Presidential elections. The civic education component did not reach the grassroots population to any significant extent through the strengthening of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP); aid to FODEP only succeeded in training a cadre of democracy trainers. The project in its last 2 years, however, did provide democratic education at the community level through its Civic Action Fund (CAF). In addition, this component helped to completely revise the junior secondary school civics curriculum (including two new textbooks) which should have a major impact on exposing schoolchildren to democratic values. Assistance to the Zambia Institute of Mass Communication (ZAMCOM), a journalism training institution, helped make it autonomous of the government. However, USAID was unable to deliver a significant portion of the equipment it had promised because of Washington's decision to sanction Zambia for regressing on democratization. ZAMCOM's long-term survival was thus jeopardized. Strengthening of the Cabinet's Policy Analysis and Coordination unit, while progressing steadily, has not achieved a number of objectives, including training in policy analysis and intergovernmental negotiation and the installation of a local area network system. In part, this component was not completed because of the U.S. Government's decision to cut democratic governance aid to Zambia in 1996. The Legislative Performance component was suspended in 1995 when the National Assembly Administration refused to come to a working agreement with project staff on a specific agenda. Michigan State University (MSU) produced the planned monitoring and evaluation products, but their impact on the project seems to have been marginal in a number of instances. The baseline study on indicators of democratic progress collected little data, and the Mid-Term Review's recommendations regarding structural improvements were only partially implemented due to the Mission Director's concerns about the report's objectivity. MSU produced a number of special studies which were of excellent scholarly interest but of little relevance to project decision making. Project management was more complex than originally envisioned. A major flaw was the lack of Zambian ownership, particularly Zambian involvement in high-level decision making. Also of concern is the high cost of the cooperative agreements with MSU and Southern University (SU). Also, management responsibilities were not well coordinated among SU, MSU, and the Democratic Governance (DG) advisor. Lessons learned include, inter alia: (1) democratization and economic reform can proceed concomitantly without interfering with each other; (2) DG projects must assume that the local political climate may become adverse to their goals; (3) DG projects may effectively use patronage under certain circumstances to sustain their objectives; (4) policy research should focus on important decisions confronting project staff; (5) local participation in project decision making is imperative and requires innovative approaches; (6) caution should be exercised in asking social organizations to undertake new functions; (7) democracy projects can easily become part of domestic political conflicts and thus lose effectiveness; (8) more controversial programs are better undertaken at the local than the national level. The next stage of the program should be focused, flexible, politically cautious, simple to monitor, include Zambian participation, possess concrete gender objectives, make lines of authority explicit, be less expensive to manage, progressively reduce financing provided to beneficiaries, and have realistic goals. Possible components include, in order of priority: judicial and legal reform, civic action fund, civic forums, media independence, civil society dialogues with government, and a national visioning exercise. (Author abstract, modified)