Evaluation of US Government response to 1991/92 Southern Africa drought -- country report : Swaziland

response to the 1991/92 drought in Swaziland. A.I.D. provided over 50% of the 20,000 MTs of food relief that was channeled through the World Food Program (WFP) to 16 zones most severely affected by the 1991/92 drought. Twelve NGOs arranged the food's transport, which reached an estimated 410,000 people, 48% of Swaziland's population. A 1993 rapid assessment of health and nutrition indicated that 91% of the population in one of the worst hit target zones had received food aid. Although nutritional status among target groups deteriorated (maize-based diets are deficient in protein and nutrients), no famine-related deaths occurred. From time to time grain arrivals were delayed due to a lack of available storage facilities; however, local shortages were not significant. A.I.D. was the only major donor to provide, at the request of the Swazi government, subsistence farm families with agricultural inputs needed for the 1992-93 growing season. The activity was an outstanding success; 5 NGOs used some $1.87 million to distribute packages of seed, fertilizer, and pesticides to an estimated 14,000 farmers, facilitating the production of an estimated 24,000 MT of maize, almost 30% of the expected national harvest. Farmers repaid some of the production costs. The program's one drawback was that it provided inputs in only 5 of the 16 zones most severely affected by the drought. The following lessons were learned. (1) Donor shipments of food did not arrive until October, 1992, although Swaziland had formed a Disaster Drought Committee in January and the WFP conducted a needs assessment in March. Given the time required to assess needs, commit funds, and ship commodities, a country suddenly afflicted by a severe drought cannot rely on donors to meet initial food needs; rather it must mobilize donor interest as quickly as possible, but must use its own resources to purchase immediate relief and should be prepared to reimburse NGOs which must draw on their own resources in the early phases of the response. (2) A country with no recent experience with emergency food aid programs requires organization and management assistance from experienced donors. (3) Needs assessments conducted by UN agencies may duplicate (though not fully corroborate) assessments made by local technical staff. Although the former may lend credibility to a UN appeal, they tend to be less reliable than local assessments. (4) A drought-afflicted country can accelerate its recovery by providing farmers with agricultural inputs.