Food aid in Ghana : an elusive road to self-reliance

food aid to Ghana under P.L. 480 totaled nearly $340 million, more than 50% of all the food aid received by that country. This report assesses the impact of that aid. All P.L. 480 food aid to Ghana has been provided as a part of a much larger U.S. policy reform assistance package, which, in turn, was part of a much larger multidonor package. Either the whole package worked or failed. The package delivered from 1966 through 1972 primarily failed; though Ghana launched a series of economic reforms and received a large amount of P.L. 480 assistance during this period, a political coup prevented the reforms from taking hold and subsequent reforms planned for 1979-83 fell victim to broken government promises. However, during the last dozen years or so USAID's food aid package to Ghana has largely succeeded. Since 1983, assistance has led to the privatization of government agricultural marketing, eliminated the fertilizer subsidy, and encouraged nontraditional agricultural exports. In addition, thanks to the economic reforms supported by food aid, the GDP increased during the period 1983-1993 at an average rate of 5%, one of the longest and highest growth rates in all of Africa. Moreover, the share of those living in poverty fell from 37% in 1988 to 31% in 1992, and nontraditional agricultural exports, which help primarily the rural poor, increased from $2 million in 1984 to $160 million in 1995. Assistance provided during this later period included Title II feeding programs aimed at those most at risk (pregnant and lactating mothers, malnourished infants and children, and those living in drought areas). These programs have clearly achieved results. Each year, Title II fed over 200,000 hungry Ghanaians, fulfilling the program's specified goal. Some Title II and III projects have addressed specific food and development problems, including food-for-work projects and projects in which food was sold to generate local currency to fund development projects. These were also found to be effective; those suffering from malnutrition were fed, schools and roads were built, village-based microenterprises were developed, and new economic opportunities were created. On the down side, these projects reached only 5% of those in need. Moreover, the underlying economic, political, social, and environmental factors that caused food insecurity still exist -- a high population growth rate, low growth in agricultural productivity, low per capita income, and a significant proportion of the population living in extreme poverty. In sum, despite the overall success of P.L. 480 food aid to Ghana in the last decade or so, a large part of the country's population, 31%, still suffers from malnutrition, a problem in which Ghana still ranks near the bottom among sub-Saharan countries. The rural poor in the northern half of the country, for example, are as poor as any in Africa, and there is disquieting evidence that the urban poor, even in the largest cities of the south, are becoming poorer. Lessons learned are as follows. (1) Title I and Title III food aid is a highly flexible development tool in support of policy reforms. (2) Food aid commodities that do not compete with domestic crops do not create a disincentive to local production. (3) Food aid can create a dependency or preference for an imported commodity, such as wheat. (4) Title II feeding programs are a "social safety net" or "holding action" temporarily helping beneficiaries. (5) More study is needed of the relative importance of factors causing food deficits in highly food-insecure recipient countries. (6) Increased Title II monetization and the increased availability of local currency resources from Title III have significantly boosted the ability of NGOs to increase the impact of development projects.