Senegal cereals production II : mid-term evaluation report

Special midterm evaluation covers the period 1979-11/83 and is based on document review, visits to sample villages, and interviews with Government of Senegal (GOS) and USAID/S officials and with farmers. Progress has been made, despite an inordinate number of misunderstandings between A.I.D. and SODEVA and of policy and institutional changes. Expected increases in cereals and groundnut production will not be achieved, but many other objectives are well on the way to attainment. SODEVA has evolved into a more professional, more capable extension organization. It has developed effective linkages with agricultural research and sponsored farmer trials of on-station research results; lightened its touch in transferring technologies to farmers; developed a genuine group approach to extension; and, in the face of GOS-mandated reductions in field staff, has hired additional professional staff, while emphasizing a paraprofessional field approach and literacy training of both field staff and farmers. Audiovisual extension is behind due to building and equipment problems. The women in development (WID) component has been somewhat peripheralized, but many WID activities (e.g., communal fields, sheep fattening, woodlots) are going well and management skills are being institutionalized. Also, SODEVA failed to take advantage of two-thirds of its long-term training slots (ISRA, the national agricultural research organization, used all of its long-term training). Due to project delays, funds are still available to accelerate progress in these areas and in research. Funding has been a constant source of friction, most crucially so in 4/83, when A.I.D. temporarily cut off procurement funding due to GOS failure to submit a strategy for handling recurrent costs. Confusion resulting from this action, as well as from, inter alia, top-level changes in SODEVA staff and in USAID/S project managers, and radical alterations in GOS agricultural policy (affecting agricultural input and credit systems as well as the cooperative movement), absorbed considerable management resources, contributing significantly to the project's failure to meet expected outputs. Recommendations and options for continued support to SODEVA are included.