Zambia agricultural development, research and extension (ZAMARE)

PES covers the period 8/82-5/86; methodology is not specified. ZAMARE is a successful project which is beginning to increase the DOA"s ability to transfer relevant agricultural technologies to small farmers. ZAMARE"s restructuring of the DOA"s research and extension programs, primarily through the establishment of maize, soybean, and sunflower Commodity Research Teams (CRT"s), has produced research recommendations and results relevant to the small farmer. In fact, the CRT component has been an unqualified success; research methods have been good and the process of on-the-job training strong. An Adaptive Research Planning Team (ARPT), established to analyze farming systems in the Central Province and identify research relevant to small farm needs, has been less successful. Although the lack of formal recommendations from the ARPT can be traced to the long - and necessary - process of verifying research results, not all the background research needed to identify farming systems was completed as required, and the process of institutionalizing analysis methodology has not progressed satisfactorily. A new group of scientists has replaced the original group, who were not adequately qualified or trained in farming systems research (FSR). Under ZAMARE"s training component, a total of 130 individuals will eventually be sent to the United States for training (including 50 for degree training), and a core of trained Zambian research and extension specialists is being established. However, more in-service and in-country training of technicians and field extension workers is needed, and funding of B.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees should be done only on an exceptional basis. More cost-effective alternatives to U.S. short-term training should be explored as well. The project teaches the following lessons. (1) A.I.D. should assume that Title XII contractors need much training and guidance in undertaking FSR assignments. (2) The project"s team approach to research offers the opportunity of training more than one counterpart per advisor. (3) USAID/Z"s use of a Project Support Unit to provide administrative support to several projects concurrently has proven confusing and reduplicative. (4) Project training will not have a significant impact unless there is a coherent training/institution-building strategy. (5) Governments with severe economic problems cannot be expected to provide counterpart. It is recommmended that a 5-year Phase II project be approved.