Designing Democracies in a Dangerous World: A Review

Reynolds draws on the experiences of 66 countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Burma, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Lebanon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He argues that political inclusion, utilizing constitutional engineering, offers the best solution to resolve conflicts, but it is not a perfect solution. Reynolds applies a medical treatment approach to democracy design, considering broader issues such as managing conflict versus curing it, misdiagnosing conflict, using first aid versus convalescence, and holistic design. He also examines the importance of constitutional limits and the role of democracy advisers who use a one-size-fits-all approach. The author looks at various independent variables, including demographic context, sociopolitical context, economic context, and historical context, to operationalize democracy and stability as dependent variables. Reynolds tests his consensus versus majoritarian approach (democratic alignment) with political stability using data from 66 cases and finds variation. He concludes that political stability is more likely when wealth/human development increases, conflict is not communally or ethnically based, the ancien regime is left-of-center if authoritarian in the past, and there is broad support of the nation across groups. Among significant historical and institutional variables, past political rules and wealth creation matter but their impacts can be lessened over time. Electoral systems are the most important of political institutions when promoting democratic participation. Reynolds examines various electoral systems, ranging from first past the post (FPTP) to mixed member parliament (MMP) to block to list PR (proportional representation), and finds that 59 countries have changed systems from 1989-2009 (70% becoming more proportional). He argues that block systems result in problems in political stability, FPTP should never be used in developing countries, and mixed systems are an improvement on both. The author also looks at legislative inclusion and focuses on several socio-political groups, claiming that if these marginalized groups gain politically, then all of society is better off. Reynolds finds that ethnic minority parliamentarians are more numerous in block vote and MMP countries, but there is no relationship between higher minority representation and policies that might impact minorities. He also examines the role of power-sharing in the government, between the center and local regions, and in how wealth is shared, and concludes that institutional power-sharing occurs in the government, between the center and local regions, and in how wealth is shared. Reynolds suggests several solutions to promote democracy in post-conflict countries, including creating a theory of design that permits building institutions needed for various societies, knowing solutions for creating stability are not necessarily the ones needed for creating long-term democracy, using appropriate experts to pre-plan a society's transition, finding a good exit strategy for the authoritarian or caretaker leadership, understanding the pre-existing institutions and where they came from, allowing for space for more democratically-elected leaders and multiple points, reducing the influence of private armies and militias, bringing in the diaspora of a society for expertise, experience, and energy, sequencing elections properly by starting at the local level and working up, and having an adequate state that can deliver services and enforce laws locally before doing anything else.