Human Security and Community Protection Assessment Final Report

The illicit economy, primarily driven by drug production and trafficking, has expanded significantly, increasing competition among illegal armed groups and criminal groups and the level of resources available to them. The splintering of illegal armed actors is also a significant factor, resulting from pressure from the public against organizations such as the Gulf Clan and the emergence of FARC dissident groups who rejected the peace agreement. Additionally, the Government of Colombia (GOC) failed to exercise control over territories abandoned by the FARC following its demobilization, leading to an escalation of violence by criminal actors and increased victimization of communities. The GOC has demonstrated its inability to provide community security due to several factors. The Colombian public force has had its budgets reduced, limiting their capability to conduct protective missions. A poorly designed institutional arrangement in charge of community protection creates a systemic overlap of functions and extreme inter-agency rivalry. Furthermore, deep trust issues between security forces, authorities, and authorities make cooperation extremely difficult for security. Additionally, local and regional authorities, critical in community security, have demonstrated a limited capability for effectively coordinating and harmonizing institutions and resources. Communities have developed their own strategies to address violence. In some cases, communities have accepted the criminal order, following the rules imposed by illegal actors or leaving the area. In other cases, social organizations have developed tools for self-protection. These tools include communication networks, safe heavens, and disseminating information through media outlets, public protests, and presenting complaints to national and international human rights bodies. These strategies have produced meaningful results and mitigated the suffering of the population. However, the level of social cohesion and the tradition of social mobilization have a significant impact on the choice made by communities between submission or self-protection. The situation in the target regions, including Bajo Cauca, Nariño's Pacific Coast, and Catatumbo, is a reflection of the general security crisis in the country. These areas have experienced a significant expansion of illegal economies and a fragmentation of illegal armed actors, leading to an escalation of violence. The GOC has increased the presence of security forces, but this has not resulted in a reduction in violence. Community policing and protection schemes have also been insufficient or ineffective. Communities have developed different strategies to address the escalation of violence, but these have had limited effectiveness in reducing victimization. A combination of efforts could increase the effectiveness of strategies to reduce violence. First, the GOC should reorganize the system for community protection at the local level, strengthening the role of municipalities and the Public Ministry as channels of communication and coordination between communities and security forces. Second, social organizations should be more cohesive and less fragmented to effectively manage security in their territories and implement their self-protection mechanisms. Finally, it is essential to establish cooperative relationships between communities, security forces, and authorities to address the security crisis and provide protection to communities.